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JURIST Special Guest Columnist Lt. Col. Chris Jenks (USA), Chief of the International Law Branch of
the Office of the Judge Advocate General, says that the discussion on child soldiers in general and
Omar Khadr in particular should be broadened to move past misperceptions of the applicable
law and norms concerning detention and prosecution of child combatants....
In the fall of 2009, Attorney General Eric Holder announced that Canadian Omar Khadr would
likely be tried by military commission for, among other offenses, the murder of U.S. Army
Sergeant First Class Christopher Speer. Khadr is alleged to have thrown a grenade which killed
Speer and wounded another U.S. Army soldier during a 2002 engagement in Afghanistan. Khadr
also faces other charges which stem from his alleged participation in: al Qaeda "basic training,"
land mine training, the conversion of land mines into improvised explosive devices, and the
shooting and killing of two Afghan militia members. 
Canada's announcement that it will not seek Khadr's repatriation means that not only is Khadr
likely to face trial by military commission, he may well be the first to do so under the revised
commissions the Obama administration employs. 
Much of the attention on Khadr's case has focused on his age — according to his defense counsel
he was 15 years and 10 months at the time of his alleged offenses. Much of the attendant
criticism which flows from Khadr's age when detained, and the authority to hold him criminally
responsible, is misdirected if not misplaced. Such critiques overlook well established
international norms which provide not only for restricting Khadr's liberty but also for holding him
accountable for any crimes he may have committed. These norms are extant both in the lex
specialis, the law of armed conflict (LOAC), and in more general international law writ large. The
discussion about child soldiers could, and should, be broader.
Under the LOAC, the Fourth Geneva Convention on civilians discusses the detention of
individuals who, like Khadr, don't qualify as either members of a regular or irregular armed force
and thus are not considered prisoners of war under the Third Geneva Convention. Additionally
(and more specifically), regardless of whether you characterize the armed conflict in Afghanistan
in 2002 as international (IAC) or non-international (NIAC) in nature, the Additional Protocols (AP)
to the Geneva Convention clearly envision the detention of "children" who directly participate in
hostilities. While the United States has not ratified either of the APs, and one can argue about the
applicability of the various Geneva Conventions to the current conflicts, through Department of
Defense Directive 2311.01E, the United States policy is to apply the law of war during all armed
conflicts, regardless of how such conflicts are characterized. Perhaps more relevant to this
discussion, the majority of the world has ratified the APs and detention of individuals like Khadr is
consistent with those widely subscribed instruments.
Additional Protocol I, which deals with IAC, discusses the protection of children in art. 77. While
art. 77 affords special protections, those protections apply to children under 15. Even then, the
special protections do not preclude children, even those under 15, from being arrested, detained,
or interned if they take a direct part in hostilities. Under AP I, persons who had not reached 18
years of age when they committed an offense related to armed conflict are not subject to the
death penalty. The clear inference is that such individuals may be held criminally responsible for
their actions and subject to punishment, just not capital punishment.
Additional Protocol II, which deals with NIAC, describes the care and aid children require in art. 4,
and in slightly more detail than AP I. It does so first as applied to children who do not take a
direct part in hostilities or who have ceased to take part in hostilities. It then qualifies that the
special protections remain applicable to children under 15 who have taken a direct part of
hostilities. Again though, the special protections do not include protection or immunity from
internment or detention, and wouldn't apply to Khadr anyway as he was not under 15.
Most of the provisions of the APs reflect current U.S. practice (see Michael Matheson, The US
Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the
1949 Geneva Conventions, Remarks before Session One of the Humanitarian Law Conference
(Fall 1987), 2 AM. U. J. Int'l Law & Pol'y 419 (1987). But to the extent that the APs are considered
anachronisms and not indicative of evolving norms against child soldiers, fair enough. Yet the
normative evolution focuses on increasing the minimum age for direct participation in hostilities
and for recruitment into armed groups--not on preventing prosecutions of those in violation of
the norm. The detention provisions of the LOAC should not be viewed as an aberration or radical
departure from how the world community otherwise views detention and prosecution of child
offenders. They are not.
The international community has struggled to reach consensus on at what age children may be
held criminally responsible. The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) defines a child as
anyone under 18 and while the CRC provides special protections to children, those protections
don't include immunity from prosecution and punishment (other than capital punishment or life
imprisonment without possibility of release). The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for
the Administration of Juvenile Justice (Beijing Rules) were also not able to agree on an age trigger
for criminal responsibility, instead that decision is left to individuals States with the guidance that
the age should not be set at too low a level and should reflect emotional, mental, and intellectual
maturity. Under the Rome Statute, the International Criminal Court lacks jurisdiction over
persons under the age of 18 while the Statute for the Special Court for Sierra Leone allowed for
prosecution of children age 15 and older, although no such prosecutions occurred.
The era of the doli incapax rule, an irrebutable presumption that children may not be held
criminally responsibly, is over. Even when it existed, it did not extend past the age of 14. This is
borne out in international practice, for example in 1993 the United Kingdom found two 11-year-
olds criminally responsible for kidnapping and murdering a two year old boy. In reviewing that
decision, the European Court for Human Rights, in T and V v. UK, ruled that attributing criminal
responsibility to a 10 year old did not in and of itself give rise to a violation of the European
Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The Court also noted that the age of
ten cannot be said to be so young as to differ disproportionately from the age-limit followed by
other European States. 
While aspects of children and criminal responsibility are either unsettled or left to individual
nations, at a minimum we should acknowledge that the LOAC provides authority to detain and
prosecute individuals like Khadr. Moreover, in the broader sense, there isn't a norm governing
the age of criminal responsibility but if there was (or is), the prosecution of an individual two
months shy of their 16th birthday for murder would fit safely within its ambit.
Chris Jenks is a Lieutenant Colonel and Judge Advocate in the United States Army. The opinions
expressed above are exclusively those of the author, and not necessarily reflective of any agency
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